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The current research adopted a multipronged mediational approach to test an associative self-
anchoring account of automatic intergroup evaluation change following perspective taking. 
We contend that actively contemplating outgroup membersÕ perspectives strengthens 
associative links between that outgroup and the self, enabling a transfer of positive automatic 
self-evaluations to the group. A first set of experiments, using both measurement-of-
mediation and experimental-causal-chain designs, supported a model in which strengthened 
selfÐoutgroup associations underlie perspective takingÕs positive effects on automatic 
intergroup evaluations. Additional experiments, using a moderation-of-process design, found 
that the benefits of perspective taking were attenuated when measured or manipulated 
automatic self-evaluations were relatively negative, preventing positive associative transfer. 
A final experiment uncovered a practical downstream implication of our causal model, as 
perspective-taking-induced changes in automatic intergroup evaluations were still evident 1 
day later. Overall, these findings supported our associative self-anchoring account; additional 
analyses found no support for an alternative, empathy-based account.  
 
Keywords: automaticity; intergroup attitudes; perspective taking; prejudice; self-anchoring 
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Perspective Taking and Automatic Intergroup Evaluation Change:  
Testing an Associative Self-Anchoring Account 
Social scientific inquiry has long been committed to developing effective methods for 
cultivating mutually-beneficial intergroup relations. This theoretical and empirical dedication 
has unearthed several promising approaches for attenuating both overt and covert expressions 
of intergroup bias (Bodenhausen, Todd, & Richeson, 2009; Paluck & Green, 2009). One such 
strategy, perspective taking, involves contemplating another personÕs thoughts, feelings, 
intentions, and other mental states. Widely considered among the most noteworthy of human 
mental faculties, the ability to reason about othersÕ minds is crucial for successfully 
negotiating the social world (Apperly, 2011; Epley & Waytz, 2010). An accumulating body 
of evidence indicates that actively imagining the psychological experiences of stigmatized 
outgroup members, in particular, can be an effective strategy for undercutting processes 
involved in the perpetuation of negative stereotypes (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Todd, 
Galinsky, & Bodenhausen, 2012b), for increasing recognition of the harsh realities of 
discrimination (Dovidio et al., 2004; Todd, Bodenhausen, & Galinsky, 2012a), and for 
promoting positive intergroup evaluations (Batson et al., 1997; Dovidio et al., 2004; Galinsky 
& Ku, 2004; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Shih, Wang, Bucher, & Stotzer, 2009; Todd, 
Bodenhausen, Richeson, & Galinsky, 2011; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003). The salutary 
effects of perspective taking also have been observed in rapid, automatically activated 
intergroup reactions (Shih, Stotzer, & Gutirrez, in press; Todd et al., 2011; see also Devine, 
Forscher, Austin, & Cox, 2012) and in behaviors displayed during intergroup encounters 
(Blatt, LeLacheur, Galinsky, Simmens, & Greenberg, 2010; Todd et al., 2011).  
Although prior research has identified several routes through which perspective taking 
can positively alter deliberate intergroup evaluations (e.g., empathic concern: Batson et al., 
1997; selfÐother merging: Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005; shifts in attributional thinking: 
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Vescio et al., 2003), it is currently unknown whether these or related mechanisms underlie 
the positive effects of perspective taking on automatic intergroup evaluations. The current 
investigation aimed to address this question by integrating recent theorizing in the attitude 
change and self-anchoring literatures to test an associative self-anchoring account of 
perspective taking and automatic intergroup evaluation change.  
Altering Automatic Evaluations 
 A venerable history of social psychological research has examined the processes 
involved in attitude formation and change (Abarracn, Johnson, & Zanna, 2005). And with 
the rise of indirect measures of evaluation (De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 
2009; Fazio & Olson, 2003), there has been growing interest in elucidating the mechanisms 
underlying automatic evaluations in particular. Although automatic evaluations have often 
been thought to reflect highly stable mental representations rooted in long-term socialization 
experiences (e.g., Rudman, 2004; Wilson, Lindsay, & Schooler, 2000), elsewhere they have 
been conceptualized as dynamic states that readily shift (sometimes quite dramatically) 
depending on numerous contextual and strategic factors (e.g., Schwarz, 2007; Smith & 
Conrey, 2007). In line with the latter view, a sizable literature attests to the malleability of 
automatic evaluations (see Gawronski & Sritharan, 2010, for a comprehensive review), 
prompting the proposal of theoretical models aiming to delineate the mechanisms underlying 
this change (e.g., Petty, Briol, & DeMarree, 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011). 
The associativeÐpropositional evaluation (APE) model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006), for instance, posits two direct routes through which automatic evaluations may 
change. The first route proceeds from the assumption that many (if not most) targets of 
evaluation are represented in a multifaceted manner; accordingly, different factors can 
activate associative patterns reflecting different facets of that representation (Smith, 1996). 
For instance, calling to mind a few examples of liked African Americans (a social group 
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characterized by both positive and negative attributes; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) can 
activate positive group-based associative content, thereby resulting in more favorable 
automatic evaluations of African Americans as a group (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2005).  
A second route to automatic evaluation change, according to the APE model, involves 
changes in the underlying structure of associative representations. The paradigmatic example 
of evaluation change via this route is evaluative conditioning, the phenomenon whereby 
repeatedly pairing a particular entity with valenced stimuli produces corresponding changes 
in evaluations of that entity (Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Bayens, & Crombez, 2010). 
Another example comes from research on associative self-anchoring, a phenomenon whereby 
an associative link between a particular entity and the self is created, resulting in the transfer 
of (usually positive) self-associations to that entity (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996). To illustrate, 
one set of studies found that (a) simply choosing an object (e.g., a painting) was sufficient to 
create an associative link between the object and the self, (b) automatic evaluations of the 
chosen object were more positive than those of a non-chosen object, and (c) this evaluation 
change was greater in magnitude for people with relatively positive automatic self-
evaluations (Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Becker, 2007; see also Perkins & Forehand, 2012; 
Prestwich, Perugini, Hurling, & Richetin, 2010; Zhang & Chan, 2009). In both evaluative 
conditioning and associative self-anchoring, automatic evaluation change is thought to stem 
from a restructuring of associative representations rather than a shift in activated associations 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011).  
Here, we focused on this latter route to automatic evaluation change by testing an 
associative self-anchoring account of perspective taking and changes in automatic intergroup 
evaluations. This account, which is depicted in Figure 1 and described below, entails a causal 
sequence whereby adopting an outgroup memberÕs perspective strengthens associations 
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between a targeted outgroup and the self, which, in turn, enable more positive automatic 
intergroup evaluations.  
An Associative Self-Anchoring Account of Perspective Taking and Automatic 
Intergroup Evaluation Change 
In formulating our associative self-anchoring account of perspective taking and 
automatic intergroup evaluation change, we drew inspiration not only from the associative 
self-anchoring and automatic evaluation work described above but also from the intergroup 
self-anchoring literature. This literature has generally found that the projection of self-
referent information (e.g., traits, preferences, and other personal characteristics) to ingroups is 
stronger than projection to outgroups (Robbins & Krueger, 2005); this differential projection, 
in turn, has been posited to underlie ingroup favoritism and other intergroup evaluative biases 
(Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005; Krueger, 2007; Otten, 2003). 
Although meta-analytic data indicate that the strength of outgroup projection is negligible 
under default conditions (Robbins & Kruger, 2005), recent research has identified contexts 
and strategies that can strengthen associations between the outgroup and the self. For 
instance, one study found that working cooperatively with outgroup members led people to 
ascribe more self-attributes to that outgroup as a whole (Riketta & Sacramento, 2008). More 
recently, Phills, Kawakami, Tabi, Nadolny, and Inzlicht (2011) had participants undergo a 
training exercise in which they learned over a series of trials to approach facial images of 
outgroup members. Their results indicated that this outgroup approach training strengthened 
automatic selfÐoutgroup associations; importantly, these strengthened selfÐoutgroup 
associations, in turn, predicted more favorable automatic intergroup evaluations.  
Building on this recent outgroup self-anchoring work, we contend that situations 
encouraging the active contemplation of an outgroup memberÕs perspective can instill a 
similar sense of psychological connectedness between that outgroup and the self (see left side 
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of Figure 1). Evidence supporting this contention comes from a vast literature documenting 
the central role of the self as an informational base in reasoning about othersÕ mental states 
(Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Goldman, 2006; Mitchell, 2009), including 
numerous demonstrations that actively imagining another personÕs thoughts, feelings, and 
other psychological experiences can heighten perceptions of overlap in mental 
representations of self and other (Ames, Jenkins, Banaji, & Mitchell, 2008; Davis, Conklin, 
Smith, & Luce, 1996; Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007; Maner et al., 2002). Particularly relevant 
for the current investigation is research showing that a single act of perspective taking with 
an outgroup target can increase selfÐoutgroup merging. For instance, one study found that 
imagining an elderly targetÕs perspective led college students to ascribe more self-descriptive 
traits to the elderly as a group (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), and another found that 
contemplating a Black targetÕs perspective strengthened automatic associations between the 
category African American and the self (Todd et al., 2012a).  
We further contend that, insofar as perspective takersÕ automatic self-evaluations are 
relatively positive (as they are for most people; Yamaguchi et al., 2007), this positivity 
should extend to the targeted outgroup through an associative transfer process, resulting in 
more favorable automatic intergroup evaluations (see right side of Figure 1). Providing initial 
support for the moderating role of self-esteem on group evaluations is research showing that 
evaluations of novel ingroups (i.e., groups with no previous connection to the self) are more 
positive insofar as people feel positively about themselves (Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005). 
Support for the interactive effect of self-esteem and perspective taking, in particular, on 
intergroup evaluations comes from work showing that the positive effect of perspective 
taking on deliberate intergroup evaluations was stronger for people with relatively positive 
explicit self-esteem than for those with less positive self-esteem (Galinsky & Ku, 2004).  
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The current research aimed to build on this work by empirically testing an associative 
self-anchoring account of perspective-taking-induced changes in automatic intergroup 
evaluations. Despite the conceptual overlap among the literatures on self-anchoring and 
automatic evaluation, self-anchoring and intergroup relations, and perspective taking and 
selfÐother merging, to our knowledge, our experiments are the first to try to integrate these 
literatures in a systematic way. This theoretical integration notwithstanding, we see the 
current investigation as valuable for several additional reasons: First, contemporary 
expressions of intergroup bias are often covert, yet their impact is far reaching and 
consequential for the lives of stigmatized group members (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, 
& Banaji, 2009; Pager & Shepherd, 2008). Thus, it is critical to identify theoretically-
grounded strategies that can undermine these subtle biases and to explain their underlying 
mechanisms. Second, it is important to isolate the processes through which perspective 
taking, in particular, exerts positive effects on automatic intergroup evaluations because the 
mechanisms underlying changes in deliberate evaluations often differ from those underlying 
changes in automatic evaluations (for detailed treatments of these differences, see Gawronski 
& Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011). We report six experiments using three different mediational 
approaches to examine the veracity of our associative self-anchoring account of perspective 
taking and automatic intergroup evaluation change.  
A Brief Note on Mediation 
Before describing these experiments in detail, we first note several recent 
observations regarding mediation. First, the traditional approach to gathering evidence of 
psychological processes, based on recommendations from Baron and KennyÕs (1986) seminal 
article, has been to use regression analyses to assess whether a particular independent 
variable (X) causes an effect on a particular outcome variable of interest (Y) through a 
particular mediating variable (M). Despite its widespread acceptance and continued use, the 
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limitations of this correlation-based approach for making causal arguments about 
psychological processes have been articulated repeatedly in recent years (see Bullock, Green, 
& Ha, 2010; Fiedler, Schott, & Meiser, 2011; Jacoby & Sassenberg, 2011; Spencer, Zanna, & 
Fong, 2005; Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010, for detailed discussions of these limitations). 
Second, to account for some of the limitations of the measurement-of-mediation approach, 
scholars have proposed alternative approaches that aim to isolate the psychological 
process(es) of interestÑthese include experimental-causal-chain and moderation-of-process 
designs (Spencer et al., 2005; see also Jacoby & SassenbergÕs, 2011, testing-process-by-
interaction strategy). To be sure, these alternative approaches have their own limitations 
(Bullock et al., 2010; Spencer et al., 2005), and it is with these limitations of any single 
approach to mediation in mind that we undertook the experiments reported here.  
Overview of Experiments 
The current research adopted a multipronged mediational approach (Smith, 2012) to 
test an associative self-anchoring account of perspective taking and automatic intergroup 
evaluation change. Experiment 1 used a traditional measurement-of-mediation design to 
investigate whether changes in selfÐoutgroup associations following perspective taking 
predict positive changes in automatic intergroup evaluations. Additional experiments used an 
experimental-causal-chain design to provide direct causal evidence for our proposed model 
by examining whether experimentally altering selfÐoutgroup associations can produce 
corresponding changes in automatic intergroup evaluations (Experiments 2a and 2b). 
Experiments 3 and 4 used moderation-of-process designs to determine if the positive effects 
of perspective taking can be attenuated in circumstances in which positive associative transfer 
cannot occurÑspecifically, when automatic self-evaluations are relatively negative. Finally, 
Experiment 5 examined the temporal durability of these effects by assessing automatic 
intergroup evaluations both immediately and 24 hr after the perspective-taking induction.  
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To ensure that our findings generalize across different target outgroups, these 
experiments used three different stigmatized groupsÑTurks, the elderly, and African 
AmericansÑas targets. Additionally, performance on different indirect measures is driven by 
different underlying mechanisms, and the same independent variable can produce different 
results depending on which measure is used (Deutsch & Gawronski, 2009; Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2005). Thus, to confirm that our findings are robust across measurement tools 
with different underlying mechanisms, we employed variants of two widely used measures of 
automatic evaluation, one that relies on a response-interference mechanismÑthe Implicit 
Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998)Ñand one that does notÑthe 
Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005).  
On the basis of prior research linking perspective taking to increased positivity in 
spontaneous intergroup reactions (Shih et al., in press; Todd et al., 2011), we predicted that 
actively imagining an outgroup memberÕs perspective would engender more positive 
automatic evaluations of that personÕs group, regardless of the particular target group or the 
particular measure of automatic evaluations. In accordance with our associative self-
anchoring account, moreover, we anticipated that (a) changes in selfÐoutgroup associations 
would play a critical role in explaining automatic intergroup evaluation change following 
perspective taking and (b) the positive effects of perspective taking would be more (less) 
pronounced when automatic self-evaluations were relatively positive (negative). Finally, 
based on the notion that automatic evaluation change stemming from changes in underlying 
associative structure (via associative self-anchoring) may exhibit relatively high levels of 
temporal durability (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), we expected 
that these perspective-taking-induced changes in automatic intergroup evaluations would still 
be evident 24 hr later.  
Experiment 1 
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As an initial investigation of our proposed associative self-anchoring account, 
Experiment 1 used a classic measurement-of-mediation design (Baron & Kenny, 1986) to test 
a model in which changes in selfÐoutgroup associations underlie changes in automatic 
intergroup evaluations following perspective taking. We modeled this experiment on prior 
research documenting that outgroup approach training can positively alter automatic 
intergroup evaluations via strengthened selfÐoutgroup associations (Phills et al., 2011). 
Participants first underwent a procedural priming paradigm (Smith, 1994) wherein they 
composed an essay about a day in the life of an outgroup member, in this case a young 
Turkish man, who appeared in a photo (Galinsky & Ku, 2004; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; 
Galinsky et al., 2008; Skorinko & Sinclair, 2013; Todd et al., 2011, 2012a; Todd & Galinsky, 
2012). Some participants adopted the personÕs perspective as they were writing; others wrote 
their essays while trying to be objective and detached. Afterwards, participants completed 
two IATs (Greenwald et al., 1998)Ñone assessing automatic self-associations with Turks 
relative to Germans, the other assessing automatic evaluations of Turks relative to Germans.  
We had three key predictions: First, we anticipated that adopting an outgroup 
memberÕs perspective would strengthen automatic associations between the self and that 
outgroup. Second, we predicted that perspective taking would promote more positive 
automatic intergroup evaluations. Third, and most important for our associative self-
anchoring account, we expected to find support for a mediational model in which 
strengthened selfÐoutgroup associations underlie positive changes in automatic intergroup 




university students (36 women, 6 men), none of 
whom self-identified as Turkish, received a chocolate bar or coffee coupon for participating. 
They were randomly assigned to a perspective-taking or objective-focus condition. Data from 
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one participant were lost to a computer malfunction; we also excluded data from one 
participant whose mean overall response latencies on both IATs were extremely slow (> 2.5 
SDs from the grand mean), leaving a final sample of 40 participants.
2
  
Procedure and materials. In this and all subsequently reported experiments, 
participants arrived to the lab in groups of up to three. They were led to a private cubicle 
where they completed several ostensibly unrelated experimental tasks, all of which were 
administered via computer.  
Perspective-taking manipulation. As part of a linguistic task investigating Òhow 
people construct life event details from visual information,Ó participants first composed a 
short narrative essay about an unknown target person. To emphasize the seemingly random 
selection of the target, we presented participants with 8 different boxes, each of which 
purportedly corresponded to a specific person. After clicking on one of the boxes, 
participants saw a photo of a young Turkish man, along with instructions to spend 5 min 
describing a day in his life. Participants in the perspective-taking condition were asked to 
take the personÕs perspectiveÑto visualize clearly and vividly what he might be thinking, 
feeling, and experiencing during the day. Participants in the objective-focus condition were 
asked to adopt an objective perspectiveÑto not get caught up in what he might be thinking, 
feeling, and experiencing, but rather, to write as if they were a casual observer. 
 SelfÐoutgroup association IAT. Next, as part of a Òword categorizationÓ task, 
participants completed an IAT assessing automatic associations between the self and Turks 
relative to Germans (Phills et al., 2011; Todd et al., 2012a). In one critical trial block (40 
trials), participants assigned 4 self-related words (me, my, mine, myself) and 8 common 
Turkish names (e.g., Mehmet, Hatice) to one response key, and they assigned 4 non-self-
related words (they, them, their, themselves) and 8 common German names (e.g., Lukas, 
Katharina) to a different key. In another critical block (40 trials), the response mappings were 
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reversed (i.e., one key for self-related words and German names, another key for non-self-
related words and Turkish names). Before each block, participants were urged to respond 
quickly and accurately. Incorrect responses were accompanied by a red X, which remained on 
screen until participants corrected their response. An inter-trial interval of 250 ms followed 
both correct and incorrect responses. 
 Intergroup evaluation IAT. Finally, as part of a second Òword categorizationÓ task, 
participants completed an IAT assessing the degree to which they automatically associate 
Turks versus Germans with positivity versus negativity. This IAT was nearly identical to the 
previous IAT, except the labels Me and Not Me were replaced with Good and Bad, 
respectively. The stimuli comprised 10 positive words (e.g., honesty, love) and 10 negative 
words (e.g., cancer, vomit), along with the same German and Turkish names used previously.  
IAT scores were computed using Greenwald, Nosek, and BanajiÕs (2003) scoring 
algorithm. Higher D-scores on the self-outgroup association IAT reflect stronger associations 
between the self and Turks relative to Germans; higher D-scores on the intergroup evaluation 
IAT reflect an automatic preference for Germans over Turks (i.e., pro-German bias). 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses revealed no moderating effects of participant gender in any of 
the experiments; thus, the data were collapsed across this variable. We expected to observe 
higher selfÐoutgroup association IAT scores and lower intergroup evaluation IAT scores 
among perspective takers than objective-focus participants.  
In line with these expectations, perspective takers (M = -0.27, SD = 0.37) evinced 
stronger selfÐTurkish associations than did objective-focus participants (M = -0.51, SD = 
0.29), t(38) = 2.27, p < .03, d = 0.74. Also as predicted, perspective takers (M = 0.42, SD = 
0.40) displayed weaker pro-German bias than did objective-focus participants (M = 0.75, SD 
= 0.25), t(38) = 3.15, p < .005, d = 1.02.  
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 We next tested a mediational model in which changes in automatic selfÐoutgroup 
associations underlie the effect of perspective taking on automatic intergroup evaluations (see 
Figure 2). A simultaneous regression analysis revealed that controlling for changes in 
automatic selfÐoutgroup associations reduced the effect of instruction set (0 = objective focus, 
1 = perspective taking) on automatic intergroup evaluations, though it was still reliable, β = -
.35, t = 2.38, p = .02. Moreover, a bias-corrected bootstrapping analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 
2008) revealed that the indirect path through automatic selfÐoutgroup associations was 
significant, 95% CI: [-.21, -.01].  
These results offer initial evidence that is consistent with our associative self-
anchoring account. Engaging in intergroup perspective taking strengthened selfÐoutgroup 
associations and led to more favorable automatic intergroup evaluations. Additionally, using 
a traditional measurement-of-mediation design, we found support for a model in which 
changes in selfÐoutgroup associations underlie (at least in part) the relationship between 
perspective taking and automatic intergroup evaluation change. These findings complement 
prior work showing that strengthened selfÐoutgroup associations can help explain the positive 
effects of outgroup approach training on automatic intergroup evaluations (Phills et al., 
2011). Importantly, our findings extend this prior research by showing that a single instance 
of perspective taking with an outgroup target can produce comparable effects. 
Although these results fully comport with our hypotheses, the measurement-of-
mediation design we adopted fails to provide conclusive evidence for a causal relationship 
between our proposed mediator (selfÐoutgroup associations) and our outcome of interest 
(automatic intergroup evaluations). To overcome this limitation and to increase confidence in 
the veracity of our proposed account, our remaining experiments adopted alternative 
approaches to test our causal model. 
Experiments 2a and 2b 
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 Experiments 2a and 2b both used an experimental-causal-chain design (Spencer et al., 
2005) to provide direct causal evidence for our proposed model. The first link in the causal 
chainÑfrom perspective taking to strengthened automatic selfÐoutgroup associationsÑwas 
established in Experiment 1 and in prior research (Todd et al., 2012a). To establish the 
second linkÑfrom strengthened selfÐoutgroup associations to positive changes in automatic 
intergroup evaluationsÑwe used a subliminal association-strengthening paradigm
3
 
(Dijksterhuis, 2004; Grumm, Nestler, & von Collani, 2009; Riketta & Dauenheimer, 2003) to 
manipulate directly (outside of awareness) the strength of associations between an outgroup 
and the self. To increase confidence in any observed changes in evaluations stemming from 
our association-strengthening paradigm, we employed two different measures of automatic 
evaluations: Experiment 2a used the intergroup evaluation IAT from Experiment 1, and 
Experiment 2b used a variant of the AMP (Payne et al., 2005). A response-interference 
mechanism underlies performance on the IAT but not on the AMP (Gawronski, Deutsch, 
LeBel, & Banse, 2008); by including both measures, we can be confident that our findings 
are not limited to response-interference tasks. Another difference between these two 
measures is that the AMP can distinguish changes in outgroup evaluations from changes in 
ingroup evaluations, whereas the IAT cannot do so.  
In both experiments, we anticipated that participants who had undergone the selfÐ
outgroup association-strengthening procedure would evince more positive automatic 
intergroup evaluations than would those who had not. In Experiment 2b, we made the 
additional prediction that these effects would be driven by positive changes in automatic 
outgroup evaluations and not by negative changes in automatic ingroup evaluations.  
Experiment 2a 
Method. 
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 Participants. Eighty-seven German university students (53 women, 34 men), none of 
whom self-identified as Turkish, received a chocolate bar or coffee coupon for participating. 
They were randomly assigned to a self-outgroup-association, self-activation, or outgroup-
exposure condition. Data were excluded from two participants who made excessive errors (> 
25% of trials) on the letter-identification task (see below) and one participant whose mean 
overall response latencies on the IAT were extremely slow (> 2.5 SDs from the grand mean), 
leaving a final sample of 84 participants. 
Procedure and materials.  
 Strengthening automatic selfÐoutgroup associations. As part of a Òletter-
identificationÓ task, participants first underwent a subliminal association-strengthening 
procedure wherein a self-related stimulus or a non-self-related stimulus was repeatedly paired 
either with the word Turkish or with a neutral stimulus, depending on condition. The task 
consisted of 40 randomly-presented trials, each of which began with a row of Xs appearing in 
the center of the screen for 500 ms. In the self-outgroup-association condition, the row of Xs 
was replaced by the word I for 13 ms, after which the word Turkish appeared for 13 ms and 
was replaced by one of 40 target letter strings (e.g., hjwwiuxc). In the self-activation 
condition, the row of Xs was replaced by the word I for 13 ms, after which a neutral stimulus 
(the letter string xxx) appeared for 13 ms and was replaced by one of the 40 target letter 
strings. In the outgroup-exposure condition, the row of Xs was replaced by the neutral letter 
string xxx for 13 ms, after which the word Turkish appeared for 13 ms and was replaced by 
one of the 40 target letter strings. ParticipantsÕ focal task was to indicate quickly whether the 
first letter in each target letter string was a consonant or a vowel. The target letter strings 
remained on screen until participants pressed one of two response keys. An inter-trial interval 
of 1000 ms followed both correct and incorrect responses. 
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 Intergroup evaluation IAT. Next, as part of a Òword categorizationÓ task, participants 
completed the same intergroup evaluation IAT from Experiment 1. IAT scores were 
computed as in Experiment 1; higher D-scores reflect an automatic preference for Germans 
over Turks (i.e., pro-German bias). 
Results. We expected to observe lower IAT scores for participants who had 
repeatedly paired the self with the category Turkish than for those who had paired the self 
with a neutral stimulus or who had simply been exposed to the category Turkish, and we 
expected no difference between the latter two conditions. We tested these predictions by 
conducting a planned contrast (Rosenthal, Rubin, & Rosnow, 2000) comparing the self-
outgroup-association condition with the self-activation and outgroup-exposure conditions; we 
also report all simple comparisons and the omnibus analysis of variance (ANOVA).  
As expected, the critical contrast comparing the pro-German bias of participants in 
self-outgroup-association condition with that of participants in the self-activation and 
outgroup-exposure conditions was reliable, t(81) = 2.27, p < .03, d = 0.50 (see Figure 3). 
Additional comparisons revealed that pro-German bias was weaker in the self-outgroup-
association condition than the self-activation condition, t(81) = 1.94, p < .06, d = 0.43, and 
the outgroup-exposure condition, t(81) = 1.98, p = .05, d = 0.44, whereas the self-activation 
and outgroup-exposure conditions did not differ from each other, t < 1, p > .95, d < 0.02. 
Overall, the effect of experimental condition was marginally significant in a one-way 
ANOVA, F(2, 38) = 2.58, p = .08, ηp
2
 = .06. 
Experiment 2b 
Method. 
 Participants. Ninety-seven German university students (56 women, 41 men), none of 
whom self-identified as Turkish, received a chocolate bar or coffee coupon for participating. 
As in Experiment 2a, they were randomly assigned to a self-outgroup-association, self-
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activation, or outgroup-exposure condition. Data were excluded from one participant for 
making excessive errors (> 25% of trials) on the letter-identification task; we also excluded 
data from five participants for not following instructions
4
, leaving a final sample of 91 
participants. 
Procedure and materials.  
 Strengthening automatic selfÐoutgroup associations. As part of a Òletter 
identificationÓ task, participants first underwent the same association-strengthening 
procedure from Experiment 2a.  
 Intergroup evaluation AMP. Next, as part of a task investigating Òhow people make 
rapid categorization judgments while being distracted,Ó participants completed an AMP 
(Payne et al., 2005) assessing automatic evaluations of Turks and Germans. Each trial began 
with a fixation cross for 1000 ms, which was replaced by a prime stimulus for 75 ms. The 
prime stimulus was followed by a blank screen for 125 ms, after which a Chinese character 
appeared for 100 ms. The Chinese character was replaced by a black-and-white pattern mask, 
which remained on screen until participants pressed one of two keys to indicate whether they 
considered that character to be more pleasant or more unpleasant than the average Chinese 
character. Participants were instructed to respond using their ÒgutÓ reaction and to avoid 
being influenced by the prime. The task included a total of 72 randomly-ordered trialsÑ24 
trials for each of the two prime categories (i.e., Turkish, German) and 24 filler trials on which 
a gray square served as the prime stimulus. The group prime stimuli were 12 facial images of 
Turkish-looking men and 12 facial images of German-looking men
5
; each appeared twice 
during the task. The target stimuli were 72 distinct Chinese characters; each appeared once. 
AMP scores were computed by calculating the proportion of Òmore pleasantÓ responses 
following each of the group primes. 
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Results. A 3 (Association Strengthening) × 2 (Group Prime) mixed ANOVA on these 
scores yielded the expected interaction, F(2, 88) = 3.23, p = .04, ηp
2
 = .07. To specify this 
interaction in terms of our hypotheses and to allow a direct comparison with Experiment 2a, 
we created an index of pro-German bias by subtracting the proportion of Òmore pleasantÓ 
responses following Turkish primes from the proportion of Òmore pleasantÓ responses 
following German primes. We then conducted a planned contrast (Rosenthal et al., 2000) 
comparing the self-outgroup-association condition with the self-activation and outgroup-
exposure conditions; we also report all simple comparisons (the omnibus ANOVA is 
identical to the two-way interaction reported above).  
As expected, the critical contrast comparing the self-outgroup-association condition 
(M = -0.06, SD = 0.19) with the self-activation (M = 0.04, SD = 0.21) and outgroup-exposure 
conditions (M = 0.04, SD = 0.18) was reliable, t(88) = 2.54, p = .01, d = 0.54. Additional 
comparisons revealed that pro-German bias in the self-outgroup-association condition was 
weaker than that observed in the self-activation, t(88) = 2.20, p = .03, d = 0.47, and outgroup-
exposure conditions, t(88) = 2.20, p = .03, d = 0.47. The self-activation and outgroup-
exposure conditions did not differ from each other, t < 1, p > .99, d < 0.01.  
Additionally, we examined the proportion of Òmore pleasantÓ responses separately 
following Turkish primes and German primes across experimental conditions. As predicted, 
the critical contrast comparing automatic positivity toward Turks in the self-outgroup-
association condition with that in the self-activation and outgroup-exposure conditions was 
reliable, t(88) = 2.18, p = .03, d = 0.46 (see Figure 4). Additional comparisons revealed that 
automatic positivity toward Turks was stronger in the self-outgroup-association condition 
than in the outgroup-exposure condition, t(88) = 2.39, p < .02, d = 0.51, whereas the 
difference between the self-outgroup-association and self-activation conditions was in the 
predicted direction but did not reach significance, t(88) = 1.37, p = .17, d = 0.29. The self-
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activation and outgroup-exposure conditions did not differ from each other, t(88) = 1.00, p = 
.32, d = 0.21. Overall, the effect of experimental condition on automatic positivity toward 
Turks was marginally significant in a one-way ANOVA, F(2, 88) = 2.87, p = .06, ηp
2
 = .06. 
An identical set of analyses on the proportion of Òmore pleasantÓ responses following 
German primes revealed no differences across conditionsÑcontrasts and simple effects: ts < 
1.30, ps > .19, ds < 0.28; one-way ANOVA: F < 1, p > .38.  
Discussion 
Extending the results of Experiment 1, Experiments 2a and 2b provide direct causal 
evidence that strengthening associations between the self and a targeted outgroup can elicit 
more positive automatic intergroup evaluations. Critically, in Experiment 2b, the association-
strengthening procedure had the predicted positive effect on outgroup evaluations and no 
effect on ingroup evaluations. Together, these findings complement prior research 
demonstrating that repeatedly pairing a particular outgroup (e.g., elderly people) with positive 
stimuli (e.g., smiling faces) can engender positive automatic evaluations of that group 
(Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; Olson & Fazio, 2006). Notably, we extend this earlier work by 
showing that repeatedly pairing an outgroup category with the self (a positive stimulus for 
most people; Yamaguchi et al., 2007) can likewise promote positive automatic intergroup 
evaluations (cf. Phills et al., 2011). 
Together, the first three experimentsÑusing a combination of measurement-of-
mediation and experimental-causal-chain designsÑoffer converging support for our causal 
model, according to which perspective taking strengthens selfÐoutgroup associations and 
thereby enables a transfer of automatic self-evaluations to the targeted outgroup. Because 
most people have relatively positive automatic self-evaluations, this associative transfer 
ordinarily would be expected to produce positive automatic intergroup evaluations, as results 
from Experiment 1 attest. When automatic self-evaluations are less positive, however, this 
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perspective-taking-induced associative transfer should not lead to positive automatic 
intergroup evaluations. We examined these hypotheses in our next two experiments. 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 used a moderation-of-process design (Jacoby & Sassenberg, 2011; 
Spencer et al., 2005) to determine if automatic self-evaluations moderate the impact of 
perspective taking on automatic intergroup evaluations. Drawing on prior associative self-
anchoring work (Gawronski et al., 2007; Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005; Perkins & Forehand, 
2012; Prestwich et al., 2010), we anticipated that the positive effect of perspective taking 
would be readily apparent when automatic self-evaluations are relatively positive but not 
when they are relatively negative (i.e., when positive associative transfer is interrupted). To 
test this possibility, we had participants consider a day in the life of a Turkish target, and we 
used variants of the IAT to measure both automatic self-evaluations and automatic intergroup 
evaluations.  
Method 
Participants. Sixty German university students (38 women, 22 men), none of whom 
self-identified as Turkish, received a chocolate bar or coffee coupon for participating. They 
were randomly assigned to a perspective-taking or objective-focus condition. Data were 
excluded from two participants whose mean overall response latencies on both IATs were 
extremely slow (> 2.5 SDs from the grand mean), leaving a final sample of 58 participants. 
Procedure and materials.  
Self-evaluation IAT. As part of a Òword categorizationÓ task, participants first 
completed an IAT assessing the degree to which they automatically associate the self (versus 
others) with positivity and negativity (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). Across two critical trial 
blocks, participants assigned self-related words, non-self-related words, positive words, and 
negative words to the categories Me, Not Me, Good, and Bad, respectively. IAT scores were 
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computed as before; higher D-scores reflect relatively positive automatic self-evaluations (M 
= .61, SD = .32). 
Perspective-taking manipulation. Next, as part of a ÒlinguisticÓ task, participants 
composed a brief narrative essay about a photographed Turkish man, as in Experiment 1. 
Also as in Experiment 1, some participants received perspective-taking instructions, whereas 
others received objective-focus instructions.  
Intergroup evaluation IAT. Finally, as part of a second Òword categorizationÓ task, 
participants completed the same intergroup evaluation IAT from Experiments 1 and 2a. 
Higher D-scores here reflect an automatic preference for Germans over Turks (i.e., pro-
German bias). 
Results and Discussion  
We expected to observe lower intergroup evaluation IAT scores among perspective 
takers than objective-focus participants. Additionally, we predicted that this effect would be 
magnified for participants with higher self-evaluation IAT scores and weaker for those with 
lower self-evaluation IAT scores. We examined these hypotheses using hierarchical 
regression; main effects of Instruction Set and Automatic Self-Evaluations (standardized) 
were entered in the first step, and their interaction was entered in the second step.  
As predicted, perspective takers exhibited weaker pro-German bias than did 
objective-focus participants, β = -.32, t = 2.50, p = .02. Critically, this analysis also yielded 
the predicted Automatic Self-Evaluation × Instruction Set interaction, β = -.36, t = 2.54, p = 
.01 (see Figure 5). Simple slopes analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) revealed that, for 
participants with relatively positive automatic self-evaluations (+1 SD), perspective taking 
significantly reduced pro-German bias, β = -.64, t = 3.65, p = .001. For participants with 
relatively negative automatic self-evaluations (-1 SD), however, the effect of perspective 
taking was negligible, β = .09, t < 1, p > .66.  
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These results offer additional support for our associative self-anchoring account. 
Replicating Experiment 1 and prior research (Todd et al., 2011), we found that engaging in 
intergroup perspective taking led to more favorable automatic intergroup evaluations. 
Critically, though, this was the case only when automatic self-evaluations were relatively 
positive; the benefits of perspective taking were entirely absent when automatic self-
evaluations were relatively negative (i.e., when positive associative transfer was prevented).  
Experiment 4 
Our primary aim in Experiment 4 was to increase confidence in the robustness of 
Experiment 3Õs findings by manipulating rather than measuring automatic self-evaluations.  
To temporarily alter automatic self-evaluations, we had participants undergo a subliminal 
association-strengthening procedure (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Grumm et al., 2009; Riketta & 
Dauenheimer, 2003) wherein they repeatedly paired a self-related stimulus with either 
negative or neutral stimuli. We had three additional goals in this experiment: First, to 
demonstrate the generalizability of perspective-taking effects across different outgroups, we 
had (student) participants consider a day in the life of an elderly person. Second, to ensure 
that findings from Experiments 1 and 3 reflect the presence of perspective taking and not its 
absence in the objective-focus condition, we included a no-instruction (i.e., control) 
condition. Although prior research has convincingly demonstrated that relative changes in 
intergroup reactions are due to the benefits of perspective taking and not the possible 
detriments of an objective focus (Dovidio et al., 2004; Galinsky et al., 2008; Todd et al., 
2011; Todd et al., 2012a, 2012b), it is still useful to replicate this pattern directly in the 
present context. Third, because there is considerable debate over which of several IAT 
variants is optimal for measuring automatic evaluations (Gawronski, Peters, & LeBel, 2008; 
Han, Czellar, Olson, & Fazio, 2010; Nosek & Hansen, 2008a, 2008b; Olson & Fazio, 2004; 
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Olson, Fazio, & Han, 2009), we used a personalized variant of the IAT (Olson & Fazio, 
2004) to assess automatic evaluations of elderly people relative to young people.   
Method 
 Participants. Eighty-five German university students (43 women, 42 men), none of 
whom was elderly (age range: 18Ð37; M = 23.6, SD = 3.6), received a chocolate bar or coffee 
coupon for participating. They were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 
(Automatic Self-Evaluations: neutral vs. negative) × 2 (Instruction Set: perspective taking vs. 
control) design. Data from one participant were lost to a computer malfunction; we also 
excluded data from two participants for making excessive errors (> 25% of trials) on the 
letter-identification task and one participant for not completing the essay task, leaving a final 
sample of 81 participants.  
Procedure and materials.  
 Temporarily altering automatic self-evaluations. As part of a Òletter-identificationÓ 
task, participants underwent an association-strengthening procedure wherein the self was 
repeatedly paired with either negative trait words or neutral words, depending on condition. 
This task, which was very similar to that used in Experiments 2a and 2b and in prior research 
(Dijksterhuis, 2004; Grumm et al., 2009; Riketta & Dauenheimer, 2003), comprised 30 
randomly-ordered trials. Each trial began with a row of Xs, which appeared in the center of 
the screen for 500 ms. The row of Xs was replaced by the word I for 13 ms. In the 
self+negative condition, I was replaced by one of 15 negative trait words that are not 
stereotypic of the elderly (e.g., lazy, stupid) for 13 ms; in the self+neutral condition, I was 
replaced by one of 15 neutral words (e.g., chair, table) for 13 ms. Each negative and neutral 
word appeared twice. In both conditions, the negative and neutral words were followed by 
one of 30 letter strings (e.g., hjwwiuxc). ParticipantsÕ focal task again was to decide whether 
the first letter in each string was a consonant or a vowel. 
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Prior research has confirmed the efficacy of similar procedures for temporarily 
reducing the positivity of self-evaluations (Riketta & Dauenheimer, 2003); nevertheless, we 
sought to verify the efficacy of our (slightly different) procedure for temporarily altering 
automatic self-evaluations in our participant population. To do so, we had a separate sample 
of 20 students undergo this association-strengthening procedure and then complete the self-
evaluation IAT from Experiment 3. Although participants in the self+negative condition 
continued to exhibit automatic self-evaluations that were quite positive in an absolute sense 
(M = 0.57, SD = 0.41; p < .001), importantly, they evinced less positive automatic self-
evaluations than did participants in the self+neutral condition (M = 0.91, SD = 0.24), t(18) = 
2.21, p = .04, d = 1.04. These findings attest to the effectiveness of this procedure for 
temporarily altering automatic self-evaluations in the intended direction.  
 Perspective-taking manipulation. Next, as part of a ÒlinguisticÓ task, participants 
composed a brief narrative essay about a photographed elderly man. Some participants 
received the same perspective-taking instructions from Experiments 1 and 3; others wrote 
their essays without any additional instructions (i.e., control condition).  
 Personalized intergroup evaluation IAT. Finally, as part of a Òrapid categorizationÓ 
task, participants completed a personalized IAT (Olson & Fazio, 2004) assessing the degree 
to which they associate elderly (versus young) people with positivity and negativity. This 
IAT was similar to the intergroup evaluation IAT from Experiments 1 and 2a, but with 
several changes: First, the categories German and Turkish were replaced with Young and 
Old, respectively; the stimuli representing these categories were facial images of 6 elderly (3 
male, 3 female) and 6 young people (3 male, 3 female). Second, the categories Good and Bad 
were replaced with I Like and I Dislike, respectively; the stimuli representing these categories 
were the same 10 positive and 10 negative words as before. Third, no error feedback was 
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provided. IAT scores were computed as before; higher D-scores reflect an automatic 
preference for young people over elderly people (i.e., pro-youth bias). 
Results and Discussion 
 We expected to observe lower IAT scores among perspective takers than control 
participants. Additionally, we predicted that this effect would be present only when automatic 
self-evaluations were relatively positive (i.e., self+neutral condition) and would not emerge 
when automatic self-evaluations were relatively negative (i.e., self+negative condition).  
A 2 (Automatic Self-Evaluation) × 2 (Instruction Set) ANOVA revealed the expected 
interaction, F(1, 77) = 4.30, p = .04, ηp
2
 = .05. As displayed in Figure 6, simple comparisons 
indicated that when automatic self-evaluations were relatively positive, perspective takers 
evinced less pro-youth bias than did control participants, t(36) = 2.36, p = .02, d = 0.79. 
When automatic self-evaluations were relatively negative, however, the positive effect of 
perspective taking was attenuated, |t| < 1, p > .68, d = -0.13.  
These results complement those from Experiment 3 by showing that experimentally-
altered automatic self-evaluations moderate the effect of perspective taking on automatic 
intergroup evaluations. Whereas participants with relatively positive automatic self-
evaluations exhibited more positive automatic intergroup evaluations after engaging in 
perspective taking, those with relatively negative automatic self-evaluations did not. 
Additionally, our use of a no-instruction, control condition increases our confidence that the 
effects observed in Experiments 1 and 3 stem from the presence of perspective taking rather 
than its absence when adopting an objective focus (see also Dovidio et al., 2004; Galinsky et 
al., 2008; Todd et al., 2011; Todd et al., 2012a, 2012b).  
The findings reported thus far provide converging evidence in line with our 
associative self-anchoring account. Experiments 1, 2a, and 2bÑusing a combination of 
measurement-of-mediation and experimental-causal-chain designs and two different 
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measures of automatic intergroup evaluationsÑfound support for a causal model in which 
perspective taking strengthens selfÐoutgroup associations, which, in turn, promote more 
positive automatic intergroup evaluations. Additional findings from Experiments 3 and 4Ñ
using moderation-of-process designs with both measured and manipulated instantiations of 
automatic self-evaluations, two targeted outgroups, two comparison conditions, and two 
measures of automatic intergroup evaluationsÑalso comport with our associative self-
anchoring account. One practical implication of this account, derived from the APE model 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), is that changes in associative structure (via associative 
self-anchoring) should produce changes in automatic intergroup evaluations that exhibit a 
relatively high level of temporal durability (see also Fazio & Olson, 2003). Our final 
experiment investigated this possibility.  
Experiment 5 
 Experiment 5 examined the temporal durability of changes in automatic intergroup 
evaluations following perspective taking. To examine the generalizability of our effects 
across another outgroup, we had participants consider a day in the life of a young Black man, 
either while taking his perspective or while adopting an objective focus. Afterwards, 
participants completed a variant of the AMP that included facial images of Blacks, Whites, 
and Asians as prime stimuli; this allowed us to assess automatic evaluations of the targeted 
outgroup (i.e., Blacks) as well as evaluations of a different, non-targeted outgroup (i.e., 
Asians). Participants then returned to the lab 24 hr later to complete the same AMP a second 
time. We selected an interval of 24 hr based on prior work assessing the durability of changes 
in automatic intergroup reactions (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000). 
We had three key predictions: First, as before, we expected that perspective takers 
would display more positive automatic intergroup evaluations than would objective-focus 
participants. Second, we anticipated that this effect would be driven by positive changes in 
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automatic evaluations of Blacks (i.e., the targeted outgroup) rather than by positive changes 
in automatic evaluations of outgroups more generally. Third, we predicted that this pattern of 
automatic evaluation change would be evident both immediately and 24 hr later.  
Method 
 Participants. Seventy-two American university students (36 women, 29 men, 7 
unreported), none of whom self-identified as Black or Asian (55 White, 11 Latino/a, 7 
unreported), participated for course credit. They were randomly assigned to a perspective-
taking or objective-focus condition. Data from one participant were lost to a computer 
malfunction; we also excluded data from four participants whose response times were faster 
than 100 ms on more than 25% of AMP trials, leaving a final sample of 67 participants.
 Procedure and materials. 
 Perspective-taking manipulation. As part of a ÒlinguisticÓ task, participants first 
composed a brief narrative essay about a photographed Black male. Some participants 
received perspective-taking instructions; others received objective-focus instructions. 
 Intergroup evaluation AMP: Time 1. Next, as part of a task investigating Òhow 
people make rapid categorization judgments while being distracted,Ó participants completed 
an AMP assessing automatic evaluations of Blacks, Whites, and Asians. This AMP was 
identical to the one from Experiment 2b, except it included a total of 96 randomly-ordered 
trialsÑ24 trials for each of the three prime categories (i.e., Black, White, Asian) and 24 filler 
trials on which a gray square served as the prime. The prime stimuli were 12 facial images of 
Black men, 12 images of White men, and 12 images of Asian men; each appeared twice 
during the task. The target stimuli were 96 distinct Chinese characters; each appeared once.  
 Intergroup evaluation AMP: Time 2. Participants then returned to the lab 24 hr later 
to complete the same intergroup evaluation AMP. AMP scores were computed by calculating 
the proportion of Òmore pleasantÓ responses following each of the group primes: Black, 
PERSPECTIVE TAKING AND ASSOCIATIVE SELF-ANCHORING 
 
29 
Asian, and White. Seven participants did not return for the second session; thus, analyses are 
based on the 60 participants who completed both sessions.  
Results and Discussion 
A 2 (Instruction Set) × 3 (Group Prime) × 2 (Time of Assessment) mixed ANOVA, 
with repeated measures on the last two factors, revealed a significant Instruction Set × Group 
Prime interaction, F(2, 115) = 3.73, p = .03, ηp
2
 = .06, that was not moderated by Time of 
Assessment, F(2, 115) = 1.03, p = .36, ηp
2
 = .02. To specify the two-way interaction in terms 
of our hypotheses, we conducted separate 2 (Instruction Set) × 2 (Time of Assessment) 
ANOVAs for each of the group primes. Means are displayed in Table 1. 
Automatic evaluations of Blacks. Consistent with our predictions, perspective takers 
exhibited more favorable automatic evaluations of Blacks than did objective-focus 
participants, F(1, 58) = 7.30, p < .01, d = 0.60. Critically, this positive effect of perspective 
taking was evident both immediately and 24 hr later, as confirmed by a non-significant 
Instruction Set × Time of Assessment interaction, F < 1, p > .61.  
Automatic evaluations of Asians. Also as expected, adopting the perspective of a 
Black target had little influence on automatic evaluations of Asians. There were no effects of 
Instruction Set, Time of Assessment, or their interaction, Fs < 1, ps > .56.  
Automatic evaluations of Whites. Finally, as predicted, adopting a Black targetÕs 
perspective had no effect on automatic evaluations of Whites at time 1, t < 1, p > .98. At time 
2, however, results revealed an unexpected positive effect of perspective taking, t(58) = 2.35, 
p = .02, d = 0.62. This pattern of means produced a significant Instruction Set × Time of 
Assessment interaction, F(1, 58) = 3.93, p = .05, ηp
2
 = .06.  
These results indicate that adopting the perspective of a Black target led to more 
positive automatic evaluations of Blacks as a group, an effect that was evident both 
immediately following the perspective-taking induction and 1 day later. That this effect 
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persisted over time accords with our associative self-anchoring account and with theoretical 
claims that changes in associative structure (via associative self-anchoring) should produce 
changes in automatic intergroup evaluations that are relatively enduring (Fazio & Olson, 
2003; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). That perspective taking had little effect on 
automatic evaluations of Asians at either time 1 or time 2 or of Whites at time 1 also 
comports with our associative self-anchoring account and with prior research documenting 
the target-group-specificity of perspective-taking effects on intergroup evaluations (Galinsky 
et al., 2005; Todd et al., 2011; Vescio et al., 2003). To our surprise, however, perspective 
taking increased positivity toward Whites at time 2, an issue we revisit below. 
General Discussion 
The current research employed a multipronged mediational approach to test an 
associative self-anchoring account of perspective taking and automatic intergroup evaluation 
change. According to this account, adopting the perspective of a particular outgroup member 
strengthens associations between that outgroup and the self, thus enabling a transfer of 
positive automatic self-evaluations to that outgroup as a whole. Six experiments provided 
converging evidence supporting this causal model. To summarize, Experiment 1 found that 
engaging in perspective taking strengthened automatic selfÐoutgroup associations and 
engendered more favorable automatic intergroup evaluations, with changes in selfÐoutgroup 
associations predicting changes in automatic intergroup evaluations. Noting the limitations of 
correlation-based approaches to mediation, we conducted four additional experiments using 
designs that are more appropriate for making causal claims. Results from these experiments 
demonstrated that (a) directly strengthening automatic associations between the self and a 
particular outgroup enabled more positive automatic evaluations of that outgroup 
(Experiments 2a and 2b) and (b) the positive effects of perspective taking on automatic 
intergroup evaluations failed to emerge when positive associative transfer from the self to the 
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targeted outgroup could not occurÑthat is, when measured (Experiment 3) and manipulated 
(Experiment 4) automatic self-evaluations were relatively negative. Finally, in line with 
theoretical claims that changes in associative structure (via associative self-anchoring) should 
produce relatively enduring changes in automatic evaluations (Fazio & Olson, 2003; 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), Experiment 5 found that the positive effects of 
perspective taking on automatic intergroup evaluations persisted for at least 24 hr.  
These findings complement and extend prior work in several noteworthy ways: First, 
prior research has identified selfÐother merging as a mechanism underlying the effect of 
perspective taking on deliberate intergroup evaluations (Galinsky et al., 2005). Our findings 
extend this work by providing evidence that strengthened associations between the self and a 
targeted outgroup (i.e., selfÐoutgroup merging) underlie increases in automatic intergroup 
positivity following perspective taking. Additionally, whereas Galinsky and colleaguesÕ work 
(Galinsky & Ku, 2004; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) has focused exclusively on evaluations 
of elderly people, a social group in which participants may eventually be members (i.e., a 
future ingroup), our experiments used as targets both elderly people and racial/ethnic 
outgroups (Turks and Blacks) in which our participants will likely never claim membership.   
Second, prior studies have shown that extensive training procedures wherein 
participants learn to approach images of outgroup members across hundreds of trials can be 
effective for strengthening associations between the self and a particular outgroup (Phills et 
al., 2011) and for promoting positive automatic evaluations of that group (Kawakami, Phills, 
Steele, & Dovidio, 2007; Phills et al., 2011). Our findings extend this work by demonstrating 
that a single act of intergroup perspective taking is sufficient to strengthen selfÐoutgroup 
associations and promote more favorable automatic intergroup evaluations. Additionally, the 
results of Experiments 2a and 2b indicate that passive exposure to repeated pairings of a self-
related stimulus with an outgroup category label over the course of just 40 trials can produce 
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changes in automatic intergroup evaluations comparable to (albeit smaller than) those 
reported by Kawakami et al. (2007) and Phills et al. (2011).  
Third, results from Experiment 5 indicated that perspective taking increased 
automatic positivity toward the targeted outgroup (i.e., Blacks), but it did not affect automatic 
evaluations of a non-targeted outgroup (i.e., Asians). These findings comport with prior work 
showing that the benefits of perspective taking on deliberate intergroup evaluations seem to 
be restricted to the targeted outgroup (Todd et al., 2011; Vescio et al., 2003) and are entirely 
consistent with our associative self-anchoring account, which posits that adopting an 
outgroup targetÕs perspective enables a transfer of (usually positive) self-associations to that 
particular outgroup (see also Galinsky et al., 2005).  
Fourth, prior research has shown that (a) changes in deliberate evaluations of social 
groups that are associated with the self are moderated by deliberate self-evaluations 
(Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005) and (b) changes in automatic evaluations of consumer products 
that are associated with the self are moderated by automatic self-evaluations (Perkins & 
Forehand, 2012; Prestwich et al., 2010; Zhang & Chan, 2009). Results from Experiments 3 
and 4 extend this earlier work by showing that changes in automatic evaluations of groups 
that have come to be associated with the self via perspective taking are likewise moderated 
by automatic self-evaluations. That benefits did not emerge for people with relatively 
negative automatic self-evaluations adds to an emerging literature documenting qualifications 
of perspective taking as a strategy for navigating socially-diverse environments (Bruneau & 
Saxe, 2012; Skorinko & Sinclair, 2013; Vorauer, Martens, & Sasaki, 2009). For instance, a 
recent study found that perspective taking was ineffective in reducing outgroup negativity 
among perceivers who strongly identified with their ingroup (Tarrant, Calitri, & Weston, 
2012). One potential explanation for this finding, derived from an associative self-anchoring 
account of intergroup perspective taking, is that highly-identified perspective takers have 
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difficulty establishing a psychological connection with outgroup members (Riketta, 2005), 
thus impeding positive associative transfer from self to outgroup.  
Finally, in formulating our causal model, we drew on theory and empirical findings 
from the literatures on self-anchoring and automatic evaluation, self-anchoring and 
intergroup relations, and perspective taking and selfÐother merging. Indeed, we believe our 
experiments are the first to integrate them in a systematic manner. Although we derived our 
causal model from these literatures with the primary goal of explicating how perspective 
taking positively alters automatic intergroup evaluations, we believe the associative self-
anchoring account advocated here has implications beyond perspective taking. A similar 
associative transfer mechanism has already been posited to underlie the positive effects of 
outgroup approach training (Phills et al., 2011), and we contend that such a mechanism is 
likely to be initiated by and may help explain the efficacy of other interventions that 
strengthen connections between outgroups and the self (e.g., actual, extended, and imagined 
forms of intergroup contact; Crisp & Turner, 2012; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Turner, 
Hewstone, Voci, & Vonofakou, 2008).  
Testing an Alternative Account 
 Although the specific aim of the current research was to test our proposed associative 
self-anchoring account rather than to test among competing accounts, we readily 
acknowledge that other underlying processes could also be operating. One route through 
which perspective taking can promote more favorable intergroup responding is via increased 
empathic concern for the targeted group. Batson et al. (1997), for instance, found support for 
a mediational model in which changes in empathic concern underlie changes in deliberate 
intergroup evaluations following perspective taking (see also Vescio et al., 2003).  
We attempted to address an empathy-based alternative account of our findings by 
inspecting the narrative essays for the presence of empathic arousal. Specifically, we had 
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coders (three native German speakers for Experiments 1, 3, and 4; three native English 
speakers for Experiment 5; all blind to experimental condition and hypotheses) rate the 
essays on the extent to which the writer expressed empathy for the essay target (0 = not at all, 
9 = very much). Agreement among raters was reasonable across experiments (mean α = .75; 
range: .69 to .84). Results revealed that perspective takers expressed more empathy in their 
essays than did non-perspective takers in Experiments 1, 3, and 4
6
 (ps < .001, ds ≥ 1.12). 
Perspective takers also expressed more empathy in Experiment 5, though this difference was 
notably smaller (d = 0.17) and did not approach significance. Additionally, empathy was 
correlated with automatic intergroup evaluations in the expected direction across experiments 
(mean |r| = .23; range: .11 < |r|s < .42), but only in Experiments 1 and 4 was this relationship 
(marginally) reliable. Critically, though, in both cases, bias-corrected bootstrapping analyses 
yielded 95% confidence intervals that contained 0 (Experiment 1: [-.34, .19]; Experiment 4: 
[-.32, .08]). Thus, we were unable to find evidence that increased empathy underlies changes 
in automatic intergroup evaluations following perspective taking.  
It is important to note, however, that these experiments were not specifically designed 
to test an empathy-based account. Indeed, because our outgroup targets were not depicted as 
having experienced some sort of hardship or misfortune (as is typical in studies examining 
empathic concern following intergroup perspective taking; Batson et al., 1997; Dovidio et al., 
2004; Vescio et al., 2003), one could reasonably argue that our experiments, despite 
documenting evidence of greater expressed empathy among perspective takers, did not afford 
a strong test of an empathy-based account. Thus, our failure to find support for such an 
account should be interpreted cautiously. Future research using paradigms more conducive to 
eliciting empathy will be needed to determine the role (if any) of empathic arousal in 
accounting for changes in automatic intergroup evaluations following perspective taking.  
Limitations, Strengths, and Future Research Directions 
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We briefly acknowledge several limitations of the current research, each of which 
suggests potential directions for future research: First, all of our reported experiments relied 
on the same induction of perspective taking (i.e., imagining a day in the life of a stigmatized 
outgroup member who appeared in a photo). Indeed, the narrative essay task is among the 
most frequently used methods for manipulating intergroup perspective taking (Galinsky & 
Ku, 2004; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Galinsky et al., 2008; Skorinko & Sinclair, 2013; 
Tarrant et al., 2012; Todd et al., 2011, 2012a; Todd & Galinsky, 2012). Although prior 
research has documented perspective-taking-induced changes in automatic intergroup 
evaluations using other paradigms (e.g., watching a video depicting an outgroup target 
enduring racial discrimination; Todd et al., 2011, Experiment 1), future research will be 
needed to determine if our findingsÑespecially those most pertinent to our associative self-
anchoring accountÑgeneralize across different perspective-taking inductions.  
A second limitation stems from the fact that our outgroup targets were always male. 
Because group stereotypes tend to be associated more strongly with male than with female 
group members (Eagly & Kite, 1987), we elected to use male targets in the current research. 
One consequence of this decision is that targets belonged to at least one salient outgroup 
(ethnicity in Experiments 1, 2a, 2b, and 5; age in Experiment 3) for male participants, 
whereas targets belonged to at least two salient outgroups (ethnicity/age and gender) for 
female participants. Preliminary analyses, however, revealed no moderating effect of 
participant gender in these experiments or in prior research on perspective taking and 
automatic intergroup evaluation change (Todd et al., 2011). Additionally, a recent study 
found that perspective taking with a female group exemplar produced changes in automatic 
intergroup evaluations comparable to those reported here (Shih et al., in press). Nevertheless, 
given that most prior research on intergroup perspective taking has relied exclusively on a 
single target (e.g., a Black man, an Asian woman), a potential direction for future research 
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could be to incorporate multiple targets that vary systematically along more than one identity 
dimension. 
Third, although not the focus of the current research, the effects of perspective taking 
on automatic evaluations of Whites were inconsistent in Experiment 5. Adopting a Black 
targetÕs perspective had no effect on automatic positivity toward Whites immediately 
following the perspective-taking induction, a null effect that comports with prior research 
showing no effects of intergroup perspective taking on automatic reactions to Whites (Todd 
el al., 2011, Experiment 4). Curiously, though, when automatic intergroup evaluations were 
assessed again 24 hr later, adopting a Black targetÕs perspective increased automatic 
positivity toward Whites. This inconsistency is puzzling, especially when considered 
alongside Todd et al.Õs (2011) findings. Although we hesitate to interpret this unexpected 
finding pending replication, one possibility is that adopting a Black targetÕs perspective 
motivated an active regulation of positivity toward Whites at time 1. Then, at time 2, when 
this suppression motivation presumably had been relaxed, automatic positivity toward Whites 
may have become highly accessible (i.e., a rebound effect; cf. Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, 
& Jetten, 1994). A test of the veracity of this speculative claim awaits future research.  
Finally, Paluck and Green (2009) recently noted that most Òlaboratory interventions 
are often separated and abstracted from their real-world modalitiesÓ (p. 349). This criticism 
also applies to our perspective-taking induction; however, research has begun to uncover 
ways to encourage perspective taking in the absence of experimental instructions explicitly 
urging participants to do so (Neel & Shapiro, 2012; Todd, Hanko, Galinsky, & Mussweiler, 
2011; cf. Kaufman & Libby, 2012). For instance, Todd and Galinsky (2012) found that 
exposure to a multicultural (versus a color-blind) diversity ideology can strengthen 
motivations to engage in perspective taking and can facilitate perceptual and conceptual 
forms of actual perspective taking. Given that exposure to multiculturalism also has been 
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shown to promote more positive automatic intergroup evaluations (Richeson & Nussbaum, 
2004), an intriguing direction for future research could be to test whether enhanced 
tendencies for intergroup perspective taking underlie this relationship. 
We also wish to note several strengths of the current research: First, the observed 
effects of perspective taking on automatic intergroup evaluations were remarkably consistent 
across three target outgroups (Turks, African Americans, and elderly people), variants of two 
measures of automatic intergroup evaluations that rely on different underlying mechanisms 
(IAT and AMP), and participant samples drawn from two countries (Germany and the United 
States). This methodological diversity attests to the robustness of our findings. 
Second, these experiments are unique in their use of multiple, state-of-the-art 
mediational approaches (Smith, 2012) to test our causal model. Recognizing the limitations 
of traditional mediational approaches, after finding initial support for our hypotheses using a 
classic measurement-of-mediation approach (Baron & Kenny, 1986), our subsequent 
experiments employed experimental-causal-chain and moderation-of-process designs 
(Spencer et al., 2005) and found evidence that was similarly supportive of our account. This 
methodological diversity again attests to the robustness of our findings.  
Third, the current research is distinctive in its assessment of the persistence of 
perspective-taking effects on automatic intergroup evaluation change. Indeed, the majority of 
laboratory-based interventions fail to test if evaluative changes persist longer than the initial 
experimental session (Paluck & Green, 2009; for exceptions, see Devine et al., 2012; 
Kawakami et al., 2000; Olson & Fazio, 2006). Experiment 5, in contrast, demonstrated that 
perspective-taking-induced changes in automatic positivity toward Blacks persisted for at 
least 24 hr, which attests to the efficacy of perspective taking for effecting change that 
transcends the immediate experimental context. Although we selected an interval of 24 hr 
based on prior research examining the temporal durability of changes in automatic intergroup 
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reactions (Kawakami et al., 2000), we recognize that this interval is rather brief in an absolute 
sense. There is suggestive evidence, though, that the benefits of perspective taking on 
automatic intergroup evaluation might persist longer than 24 hr: Devine and colleagues 
(2012) found that a multifaceted bias-reduction intervention, which included a perspective-
taking induction similar to ours, produced changes in automatic intergroup reactions that 
persisted for up to 8 weeks. Because perspective taking was only one facet of Devine et al.Õs 
(2012) intervention, however, it is impossible to ascertain its unique contribution to their 
findings. Future research will be needed to determine more conclusively the durability of the 
effects of perspective taking per se on automatic intergroup reactions.  
Finally, in providing evidence for our causal model, we found that perspective taking 
strengthened associations between a targeted outgroup and the self (see also Galinsky & 
Moskowitz, 2000; Todd et al., 2012a). Other work has shown that intergroup perspective 
taking, in addition to activating oneÕs own personal identity (Davis et al., 2004), can activate 
oneÕs own ingroup identity (Vorauer & Sasaki, 2009). Given that selfÐoutgroup associations 
and ingroupÐoutgroup associations tend to be moderately positively correlated (Schubert & 
Otten, 2002), it seems plausible that perspective taking could lead perceivers to recategorize 
members of a targeted outgroup as part of a more inclusive ingroup (Gaertner & Dovidio, 
2000), thereby strengthening ingroupÐoutgroup associations. The work by Todd and Galinsky 
(2012) described earlier suggests that this might not be the case, however. Indeed, they found 
that the relationship between multiculturalism (an ideology that encourages the recognition 
and appreciation of intergroup differences) and perspective taking was bidirectional. That is, 
engaging in intergroup perspective taking heightened support for multiculturalism, suggesting 
the intriguing possibility that perspective taking, in addition to strengthening selfÐoutgroup 
associations, might actually weaken ingroupÐoutgroup associations. It remains for future 
research to test this possibility.  




 Despite continued scholarly interest in devising effective approaches for navigating 
demographically-diverse environments, the precise mechanisms underlying many of these 
strategies are poorly understood. We aimed to shed light on the processes involved in one 
such strategy, perspective taking. Using a multipronged mediational approach, six 
experiments provided converging support for an associative self-anchoring account of 
perspective taking and automatic intergroup evaluation change. The robustness of our 
findings notwithstanding, we concur with others (Bullock et al., 2010; Smith, 2012) that 
evidence for process is best established through programs of research (ideally across multiple 
laboratories) that systematically test among multiple, theoretically-plausible mediators. We, 
therefore, view the current work as adding a valuable piece to the puzzle and urge future 
research to continue exploring the efficacy of both our account and potential alternative 
accounts of perspective-taking-induced changes in automatic intergroup evaluations. 
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 All stimuli in Experiments 1Ð4 appeared in German, and all participants were native 
German speakers.  
2 
We also decided a priori to discard data from participants whom the experimenter noted 
were talking to each other while performing the tasks or were otherwise not following 
instructions. In total, there were 2 participants in Experiment 1, 7 in Experiment 2a, and 3 in 
Experiment 2b who met these criteria; retaining their data did not alter the pattern of results 
in any of the experiments.  
3 
Because questions have arisen about whether effects observed using the Dijksterhuis 
(2004) paradigm constitute conditioning per se (e.g., Pleyers, Corneille, Luminet, & Yzerbyt, 
2007), we have opted for the term association strengtheningÑthough potentially problematic 
itself (see, e.g., Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009)Ñto refer to both the procedure and 
the effect observed as a result of undergoing the procedure.  
4 
We excluded one participant with response times < 100 ms on more than 25% of AMP 
trials and four participants who gave the same response on > 90% of critical trials. 
5 
Pilot testing confirmed that the Turkish-looking and German-looking men were reliably 
categorized as Turkish and German, respectively. We had 49 students from the same 
population rate each of the photos (1 = Turkish, 9 = German). Results indicated that German 
targets (M = 7.55, SD = 0.74) were more likely to be categorized as German than were 
Turkish targets (M = 2.53, SD = 1.09), t(48) = 21.92, p < .001, d = 5.39; both group means 
differed from the scaleÕs midpoint in the predicted direction (ps < .001). 
6
 To afford a relatively uniform test across experiments, we restricted our empathy 
analyses to the self+neutral condition in Experiment 4. 




Proportion of Òmore pleasantÓ AMP responses by instruction set, group prime, and time of 
assessment (Experiment 5) 
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Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses; within each row, means with different 
subscripts differ (p < .05).   
 
 




Figure 1. Schematic depiction of the associative self-anchoring account of perspective taking 
and automatic intergroup evaluation change. 
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Figure 2. Mediational model in which changes in automatic selfÐTurkish associations 
underlie the effect of perspective taking on automatic pro-German bias. Numbers represent 
standardized regression coefficients; numbers in parentheses represent simultaneous 
regression coefficients (Experiment 1). 
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Figure 3. Automatic pro-German bias by experimental condition (outgroup-exposure vs. self-
activation vs. self-outgroup-association); error bars reflect ±1 SEM (Experiment 2a). 




Figure 4. Automatic evaluations of Turks and Germans by experimental condition (outgroup-
exposure vs. self-activation vs. self-outgroup-association); error bars reflect ±1 SEM 
(Experiment 2b). 
 




Figure 5. Predicted means for automatic pro-German bias by automatic self-evaluations 
(lower vs. higher) and instruction set (objective focus vs. perspective taking); error bars 
reflect ±1 SEM (Experiment 3). 
 




 Figure 6. Predicted means for automatic pro-youth bias by (manipulated) automatic self-
evaluations (neutral vs. negative) and instruction set (control vs. perspective taking); error 
bars reflect ±1 SEM (Experiment 4). 
 
